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In post-Mao China, the pursuit of national “progress” has typicallytrumped that of socialist equality. Just as schools and universities have,in practice if not always in name, been divided into “key” institutions and
the rest, so certain cities and provinces have been assigned flagship status
as China has charted a course for “modernity.” Shanghai, whose interna-
tional culture and capitalist heritage counted against it during the Maoist
era, by the 1990s found itself in the vanguard of a renewed push for ex-
port-oriented, capitalist economic growth. This vanguard status extended
to the realm of education, as in 1990 the decision was taken to designate
the city as China’s only “educational experimental zone.” (1) If certain cities
or regions were to fulfil their developmental potential, then they would
have to be liberated from the old Stalinist shackles. Where Shanghai led,
the rest of China might then follow – providing the results of its greater li-
cense met with Party approval. But the precise extent of that license has
remained vague and uncertain.
In this article, we examine the coverage of Japan in Shanghai’s senior high
history textbooks since the early 1990s. This period has seen Shanghai vie
with Hong Kong for the status of China’s main gateway to the outside
world, (2) but the city has also reflected the rising tensions between China
and its main Asian trading partner. For example, the anti-Japanese demon-
strations of April 2005, sparked by outrage at the Japanese government’s
approval of extreme right-wing history textbooks and its bid for permanent
UN Security Council membership, were “particularly large and violent in
that most cosmopolitan of China’s cities, Shanghai, Deng Xiaoping’s show-
piece for the global era.” (3) The portrayal of Japan in local history texts offers
a window onto the tensions, within official discourse, between a vision of
an outward-looking and open China and one that focuses on the legacy of
“national humiliation.”
Senior high texts provide the fullest exposition of the officially-authorised
narrative underpinning history education at all levels of schooling. Moreover,
their senior high years represent for most students their final experience of
formal instruction in history. Indeed, the majority give up history after the
first two years of senior high, with only those in the “arts and humanities”
stream studying it for a third year. We therefore focus primarily on the texts
for the first and second years. The focus on senior high texts is further war-
ranted by the rapid expansion of access to education at this level over the
period in question. In the mid-1990s, in Shanghai, as in China generally,
many students abandoned their schooling before senior high level. However,
by the early 2000s the growth of the university sector meant that most
Shanghai students were attending senior high school and sitting the college
entrance examinations (the gaokao).
This article begins with a brief discussion of the political and ideological
context – both domestic and international – for Shanghai’s curriculum de-
velopment since the early 1990s. It discusses shifts in policy and educational
scholarship that have impinged on the preparation of the history curriculum,
making comparative reference to Hong Kong, Shanghai’s chief rival for the
status of China’s premier “global city.” An overview is then provided of the
three textbook series used in local high schools since the early 1990s, dis-
cussing the historiographical and pedagogical assumptions that have in-
formed them, and ways in which these are reflected in the portrayal of Japan
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in each successive series. The article concludes by discussing how depictions
of Japan in local history textbooks have changed, the possible reasons for
these changes, and their implications. Among the questions addressed are:
to what extent have local textbooks offered a vision of Japan distinct from
that offered in mainstream official discourse (especially as manifested in
textbooks and museums); and what can the changing portrayal of Japan in
local history textbooks tell us about the nature and limits of Shanghai’s au-
tonomy in curricular matters?
History education, politics, and ideology in
contemporary China
The Sino-Japanese relationship has been bedevilled, particularly since the
end of the Cold War, by deep mistrust on both sides. Portrayals of each
country in the other’s school texts need to be considered against this back-
drop. Chinese mistrust has been reinforced by a perception that much of
Japan’s political elite remains unreconciled to and unapologetic for past mil-
itary aggression. The Japanese high school history curriculum is cited as ev-
idence, with right-wing revisionist texts attracting vehement criticism from
Chinese officials, media, and the wider public. However, as Yang Biao notes
elsewhere, (4) Japan’s school curriculum actually allots far more coverage to
Chinese history than vice versa – even if China fades from the narrative in
the modern period. In China, by contrast, it is in textbook coverage of the
modern era that the spotlight is trained most intently on Japan. (5)
The development of history education in China since the early 1990s has
been subject to two countervailing trends: on the one hand, a desire to use
history as a vehicle for patriotic education; and on the other, an interest in
the potential of history as a tool for fostering critical and analytical “skills.” (6)
Japan has been a particular focus of history-as-patriotic-education – as the
chief agent of China’s “humiliation” in the modern era, (7) and hence the
main foil for arousing patriotic indignation. Although officials have recently
seemed concerned at the intensity of popular anti-Japan sentiment, (8) hav-
ing pinned its colours to the patriotic mast, the Party’s capacity for altering
course is constrained by concerns for its own legitimacy.
At the same time, many academic educationalists and policymakers have
been attracted by notions, associated with the post-1960s “New History”
movement in the US and Britain, that history should be regarded as a vehicle
for teaching generic “skills” and for stimulating imagination and creativity. (9)
This vision was originally linked to progressive pedagogical objectives, such
as nurturing attitudes and capabilities associated with the exercise of lib-
eral-democratic citizenship. However, the vaunted rise of the “global knowl-
edge economy” has prompted emphasis on the economic dividends to be
gained from fostering analytical and creative “skills.” Shanghai’s position at
the forefront of China’s opening to the outside world, and related ambitions
to engage with that “knowledge economy,” appear to have rendered local
policymakers and curriculum developers especially susceptible to both sets
of arguments – concerning the utility of history in promoting generic think-
ing skills, and its role in fostering cosmopolitan tolerance and openness.
The idea that history should be used to promote “critical thinking” has
long been espoused by curriculum developers in Hong Kong (10) – Shanghai’s
main rival as China’s “world city.” Despite increasing contacts with the main-
land, Hong Kong’s education system remains constitutionally distinct. Nev-
ertheless, similar tensions in the aims ascribed to history education have
been evident there. Since the retrocession, there have been official efforts
to promote a state-centred patriotic orthodoxy – with implications for the
portrayal of Japan in local textbooks. However, irrespective of such shifts,
anti-Japanese sentiment has long been a strong component of Chinese
identity at the popular level. (11) Indeed, anti-Japanese sentiment relating to
the War of Resistance is one thing that broadly unites rather than divides
Hongkongers and mainlanders. For most Hong Kong people, the external
“other” that above all defines their “Hongkongese” distinctiveness is main-
land China. In this context, increasingly negative textbook portrayals of
Japan appear to have been approved as one way of reminding locals of the
sentimental ties that bind them to the “motherland.”
Until the 1990s, Hong Kong’s most popular senior high history textbooks
presented a strikingly positive interpretation of Meiji-era Japan, depicting it
as a model of Asian modernisation. (12) However, portrayals have since be-
come significantly more negative. Hong Kong texts have increasingly high-
lighted Japan’s failure honestly to confront its wartime past. The latest
edition of the most widely-used history textbook singles out Japan’s han-
dling of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands as one among a number of ways
in which the country has mismanaged post-war relations with its neigh-
bours. (13) (See also Christine Han’s article in this special feature of China
Perspectives.)
In the pre-1949 era, Hong Kong and Shanghai served as twin bridgeheads
for overseas trade, investment, and cultural influence. In recent decades they
have converged once again, economically and culturally, as a result not just
of Hong Kong’s retrocession but also of changes within the People’s Repub-
lic. Nowhere on the contemporary mainland seems so unabashedly post-
socialist as Shanghai, and nowhere is a “pre-liberation” pattern of class
inequality more in evidence; indeed, as visitors to Xintiandi or the Bund area
can observe, there has been a fashion in recent years for celebrating the
bourgeois lifestyle and heritage of the pre-1949 metropolis. (14) Shanghai’s
status as the birthplace of Chinese modernity – of a nation that is strong,
proud, and internationally respected – has come to eclipse its status as the
birthplace of the Chinese Communist Party. (15) Eschewing a narrow focus
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on the heroic exploits of Communist figures, and skirting themes of class
struggle and capitalist exploitation, institutions such as the Shanghai Mu-
nicipal History Museum and the Bund Museum celebrate the economic vi-
brancy of cosmopolitan “Old Shanghai,” adopting a perspective similar to
that seen in the Hong Kong Museum of History. (16) These accounts of the
local past do not dwell on the theme of “national humiliation” highlighted
in many other Chinese museums. However, rather than clashing with official
“patriotic” ideology, hailing international commercial success arguably taps
another strand therein. As Kirk Denton observes, celebrations of the afflu-
ence of pre-revolutionary Shanghai, and side-lining issues of class exploita-
tion or collaboration with foreign “oppressors,” in fact support an “ideology
of entrepreneurship” that is entirely consistent with the regime’s overall
economic strategy. (17)
An increasingly broad-church patriotism has assumed growing importance
for regime legitimation since the upheavals of 1989 and subsequent collapse
of the Soviet bloc. Party-sanctioned histories still rehearse the language of
historical materialism, (18) but presenting class struggle as the driving force
of historical change is problematic in a society characterised by rampant
capitalism. Indeed, China arguably presents an acute case of the ideological
“fracture” evident elsewhere as the bipolar certainties of the post-war order
have crumbled. (19) As early as 1988, the CCTV documentary series River
Elegy (He Shang) emphatically rejected state socialism, reaffirming faith in
enlightenment ideals. Foreshadowing Fukuyama’s 1989 End of History the-
sis, the programme’s makers condemned the inward-looking, oppressive
stagnation of post-Ming China, instead praising liberalism and openness as
the sources of Western (and Japanese) strength and prosperity. 1989 itself
saw the publication of a Chinese translation of Paul Kennedy’s bestseller
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (20) analysing the relationship between
the command of economic resources and the capacity to project military
power – a subject of intense interest within China, and destined to receive
the full CCTV treatment in the 2006 documentary Rise of the Great Powers
(Da Guo Jue Qi).
Popular and media interest in the historical dynamics of state power has
intensified even while enlightenment ideals – liberal or Marxist – have lost
traction since Tiananmen. In an atmosphere of “totalitarian nostalgia” during
the 1990s, attempts were made to fill the resulting ideological void with
alternative “holistic systems, paradigms, and arguments for the salvation of
China.” (21) Often these amounted to “xenophobic screeds” since, as a be-
leaguered group of liberal intellectuals put it in 1997, “propagating nation-
alism is the safest form of political opportunism there is [in China today].” (22)
This neo-nationalist turn derived additional impetus from writings such as
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations?, which fuelled resentment at West-
ern arrogance, condescension, and hostility. (23) The interaction of domestic
and international intellectual currents thus helped reinforce “a new sense
of aggrieved national sentiment” that came to play “a pivotal role in pro-
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and masses; postwar economic miracle hailed; failure to con-
front “war crimes” in China and elsewhere noted. Little men-
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Japan’s history and its aggression against China once again
covered in discrete chapters. Achievements of modernisation
hailed, but no mention of influence on China. Descent into fas-
cism and militarism portrayed as driven by “civil society.”
Elite/mass distinction absent. Heightened emphasis on
wartime atrocities.
i This is similarly ignored in the subsequent two editions.
ii Mentioned in all three editions, but without discussion of impact on Nagasaki or Hiroshima, the experiences of Japanese victims, etc.
iii Dates of publication of the formally “approved” editions; “experimental” editions were in use from 1993 and 2003 respectively.
Table 1 – Shanghai history textbook editions and their portrayal of Japan
viding political coherence and creating a framework of consensus in dealing
with pressing international issues,” including those involving Japan. (24)
This was the political and intellectual climate in which Shanghai embarked
on the development of its own senior high school history textbooks. Main-
stream narratives continued to reflect entrenched assumptions regarding
progress and national subjecthood, but largely jettisoned the substance (if
not the terminology) of socialism. The resulting historiographical vision had
much in common with those of early twentieth-century nationalists, and
of their intellectual and political heirs in post-war Hong Kong and Taiwan.
In the 1990s, as in the 1900s, an obsession with measuring China’s progress
against Western and Japanese benchmarks was matched by resentment of
those same powers for past aggression or present slights. In the rush to learn
from “developed” nations, Shanghai was tasked with renewing its old role
as the main bridgehead for modernisation. But in a climate of xenophobic
nationalism and “totalitarian nostalgia,” to what extent would local history
curriculum developers prove willing or able to emphasise themes of cos-
mopolitan openness? And as the prime target of nationalist resentment,
how would Japan fare in the textbooks of China’s most liberal city?
The 1995 (1993) series (25)
Until the 1990s, all Chinese school textbooks were published by the Peo-
ple’s Education Press (PEP) in Beijing. In 1993, a revised national curriculum
for history was issued, reflecting the themes of the new patriotic education
campaign. Subsequent PEP texts featured enhanced coverage of China’s
“humiliation” by foreign powers during the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, with a particular focus on the wars with Japan. (26) The contrast high-
lighted in earlier accounts of the “War of Resistance” between Communist
heroism and KMT weakness or perfidy was downplayed in favour of a nar-
rative emphasising the united efforts of all Chinese people. Meanwhile, as
Deng Xiaoping relaunched his efforts to reform and open up the Chinese
economy, further autonomy was granted to “special economic zones” and
“economically developed areas” – extending to some aspects of the edu-
cation system. However, the only city that actually published its own history
textbook series at this time was Shanghai.
It was only after national curriculum reforms in 2001-2002 that di-
versification of the school textbook market occurred nationally, with
four publishers (including PEP) eventually coming to dominate.
Analysing senior high textbook accounts of the Anti-Japanese war, Car-
oline Rose finds that despite significant differences, the proportion of
content devoted to this topic has generally declined across all series.
However, much of what has been omitted or compressed consists of ac-
counts of the KMT-CCP struggle and discussions of military strategy.
What is left effectively heightens the focus on the reasons for Japan’s
invasion; its brutal nature; the unity and determination of the Chinese
people in their resistance to it; and China’s crucial contribution to the
global war against fascism. “Stripping out the details and complexities
of the domestic struggle between communists and nationalists,” she ar-
gues, “actually throws a harsher spotlight on the horrors of China’s war
with Japan.” (27) The paring back of accounts of the war actually reflects
the extent to which an “extreme othering” of Japan has become “a core
article of faith of mainstream discourse on the national past” – as re-
layed through film, television, and the popular media, as well as school
texts. In other words, Caroline Rose argues that textbooks no longer del-
uge students with detail on this topic in part because they no longer
need to – they can “allude to what are now established tropes of the
officially-sanctioned narrative […], leaving students to flesh out the de-
tails from the now vast plethora of popularly-available sources.” (28)
Shanghai, however, has continued to produce its own high school history
textbooks, rather than buying in texts from one of the four nationally-dom-
inant publishing houses. The first Shanghai series was published “experimen-
tally” in 1993 before being formally “approved” in 1995. Its narrative of
modern national and global history was essentially consistent with that of
the PEP texts. For example, though the account of the War of Resistance
emphasises the leading role of the Communist Party and ineffectual per-
formance of the KMT in the early years of the anti-Japan struggle (up to
the Xi’an Incident of late 1936), the account of “all-out war” from 1937 fol-
lows the PEP texts in according greater recognition to the contribution of
KMT forces to the conventional fighting (zhengmian zhanchang). (29) Dis-
cussion of the “violence of the Japanese army in occupied areas” cites
Japan’s use of Pan-Asianist slogans calling for “unity between Japan, China,
and Manchuria” and ronghe tixie (mutual “solidarity, guidance, and sup-
port”). The hollowness of such rhetoric is demonstrated by the Nanjing Mas-
sacre, said here to have killed “more than 200,000” and featuring atrocities
such as the infamous “killing competition.” (30) The establishment of puppet
governments in Nanjing and Beiping illustrates the Japanese policy of “using
Chinese to govern Chinese” (yi hua zhi hua). A later section on “China after
the outbreak of war in Europe” notes the perfidy of Chiang Kai-shek in trying
(unsuccessfully) to negotiate a cessation of hostilities with Japan because
of his desire to continue the struggle against the CCP. The text claims that
the “liberated [i.e. CCP-controlled] areas became the main arena for the war
of resistance.” (31)
Despite such essential similarities in content and interpretation, the or-
ganisational structure of the 1995 Shanghai text was radically different not
only from its PEP counterpart, but also from textbooks used in Japan, Korea,
or Taiwan. Rather than dealing with “national” and “world” history sepa-
rately, the Shanghai texts sought to present a more integrated account. Chi-
nese events were discussed alongside those in other countries – for example
in Chapter 2 on “China and Japan after the opening of the new trade routes”
or Chapter 17 on “National democratic movements in late nineteenth and
early twentieth century Asia, Africa, and Latin America.” Chapters were sub-
divided along national lines, but repeatedly invited comparison and the
drawing of connections between national histories. The only East Asian
precedent for such an approach to the presentation of modern history at
high school level was to be found in Hong Kong. (32)
Underlying this integrated approach was a still distinctively Marxist nar-
rative substructure. The text begins with a chapter on “The Rise of Capitalism
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in Western Europe,” and the modern history of East Asia is presented as a
series of national responses to the Western “impact.” Capitalism is portrayed
as a necessary stage of historical development, wisely embraced after
“American cannons opened Japan’s closed door” (meiguo da pao dakai riben
suoguo damen). The Meiji elites’ realistic understanding of the fruitlessness
of blind rejection of the outside world (mangmu paiwai) earned them the
“encouragement and support of the masses” (renmin qunzhong de tuidong
he zhichi). (33) This is contrasted with the “official corruption and economic
weakness” blamed for China’s failed self-strengthening efforts and defeat
at the hands of Japan in 1894-1895. (34) Like China, Japan was coerced into
signing “unequal treaties,” but institutional reform and economic moderni-
sation enabled it to avoid subjugation. “The Meiji Restoration put Japan on
the road to capitalist development, [paving the way for the] later gradual
abolition of the unequal treaties, thus escaping (baituo) a national crisis
(minzu weiji), and becoming a strong Asian nation (yazhou qiangguo).” (35)
While thus praising Meiji-era nation building, the 1995 text also criticises
its class-based character. The extreme emphasis of the education system
on “loyalty and patriotism” (zhongjun aiguo) is blamed for “poisoning the
thinking of citizens.” The incompleteness of capitalist reform, and the re-
tention by “feudal remnants” (fengjian canyu) of ultimate political authority
are blamed for making Japan a “militarist feudal imperialist country (junshi
fengjian tiguozhuyi guojia) with a large tendency for invading [other coun-
tries].” (36) Japan’s wars with China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905) are
identified as marking a transition from “capitalist” to “imperialist” develop-
ment, and the text highlights the reparations levied on the defeated Qing
government after 1895, and the investment of the majority of this “huge
sum” in further military development. (37) Japan’s acquisition after 1905 of
Russia’s privileges in Manchuria, notably the Southern Manchuria Railway,
is described as an initial stage in the “invasion” of North-east China. (38)
This invasion, the ultimate consequence of perverted capitalist develop-
ment, leads to disastrous defeat and the kind of subjection to Western dom-
ination Japan had avoided during the Meiji period. Through the occupation
reforms, America “strengthened its influence and control over Japan,” while
failing to purge “remnants of militarism” (junguo zhuyi canyu). (39) The onset
of the Cold War and the Korean conflict rendered Japan a useful anti-Com-
munist base, prompting the Americans to encourage rearmament and allow
the formation of many “right-wing groups.” 1952 marked the end of the
“open occupation” and recovery of “formal independence,” but Japan re-
mained in a state of “semi-occupation” (ban zhanling zhuangtai). However,
the subsequent strengthening of its economy led to increasing autonomy
(zi zhu) and a more equal relationship with America. (40) By the 1980s, Japan
was an “economic great power” (jingji da guo), and many Japanese politi-
cians began more openly to call for political influence to match their coun-
try’s economic clout. Once again, the importance of economic strength to
resisting Western hegemony is emphasised.
While identifying the West (later joined by Japan) as “oppressing” and the
non-West as “oppressed,” the blame for this is largely attributed to the con-
tradictions of global capitalism. (41) Moreover, these are traced within as well
as between countries. Analysis of “The origins of war in Asia and Europe”
(Ya, Ou zhanzheng ceyuandi de xingcheng) appears in a chapter focusing
on the Wall Street Crash, the Great Depression and their consequences. An
examination of how “Japan became the source of war in Asia” (riben cheng-
wei yazhou zhanzheng ceyuandi) stresses the relationship between eco-
nomic crisis, growing militarism, and “fascistic” tendencies. Japan’s
escalating incursions into China during the 1930s are thus discussed against
this background of domestic turmoil. The text asserts that “the Japanese
people did not want war. But all kinds of anti-war elements in Japan at that
time were relatively weak and unable to coordinate themselves effectively.”
It describes how State Shinto and the evocation of the emperor’s divine
status were used to whip up fanatical support for a “sacred war” (sheng
zhan), leading Japan down a “criminal and dangerous path” (zui e er weixian
de daolu). (42) The characterisation of Japanese politics as “fascist,” and the
juxtaposition of this discussion with an account of the rise of Hitler, under-
lines the role of broader global currents.
The 1995 narrative thus adheres to Marxist orthodoxy in portraying na-
tions largely as pawns in an international drama driven by impersonal forces
– class struggle, capitalism, imperialism. The internationalist slant of the ac-
count extends to acknowledgement of Japan’s role in inspiring and harbour-
ing some of the key figures in China’s early-twentieth-century reformist
and revolutionary movements, including Sun Yatsen. (43) However, historical
materialist teleology ultimately fails to deliver a revolutionary telos. After
briefly mentioning the collapse of European Communism, the break-up of
the Soviet Union, the wars in Iraq and Yugoslavia, and America’s new status
as sole global “hegemon,” the text concludes by calling for “peoples of every
nation” to address themselves to two overriding challenges: the pursuit of
“peace” and of “development.” This was neutered post-Cold War socialism,
shorn of revolutionary intent, but retaining faith in progress and moderni-
sation, albeit alongside lingering suspicion of Western “hegemonism.” But
more than any explicit ideology, the integration of national and global his-
tory throughout the text delivered a vision of an interconnected world
suited to a city whose role, as Deng Xiaoping re-launched his reforms, was
to declare China open for international business.
The 2004 series (44)
The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed much debate in Chinese edu-
cational circles over “quality education” (suzhi jiaoyu), echoing concerns
expressed by educators elsewhere in East Asia. Advocates of curricular re-
form pointed to an excessive pedagogical focus on factual recall, crushing
intellectual curiosity and individual initiative – qualities seen as essential
for success in the “knowledge economy.” At the head of those calling for
“quality’-oriented reforms was the prominent Shanghai-based educator,
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Zhong Qiquan, an expert on Japan. Zhong was influenced by Japanese de-
bates over the introduction of yutori kyouiku (“relaxed” education) and cur-
ricular integration. (45) He was one of the main movers behind the 2001-2
reforms to the national school curriculum. These extended the autonomy
enjoyed by Shanghai to other provinces and municipalities, introducing the
principle of “one syllabus, many textbooks.” Rather than specifying the cur-
riculum in minute detail, syllabuses would henceforth stipulate subject aims
and the broader parameters of content, allowing for greater diversity in
teaching materials. Textbooks nonetheless remained subject to official vet-
ting and approval.
History – long associated in the minds of progressive educators with the
dead hand of ideology – was not accorded a high priority in the revised high
school curriculum; timetable space was yielded to other, ostensibly more
useful subjects (such as English). Although, at junior high level, a conven-
tional chronological approach was retained, the new senior high curriculum
reflected a different conception of the nature and purpose of history as a
school subject. In the 2004 Shanghai texts in particular, the integration of
national and global history was taken to a new level. The previous focus on
high politics was also abandoned in favour of cross-cultural comparison of
habits, customs, and institutions, as reflected in the titles of the six “themes”
around which the course was organised:
1. Early Human Civilisation (renlei zaoqi wenming)
2. Human Life (renlei shenghuo)
3. Human Culture (renlei wenhua)
4. Civilisational Blending and Conflict (wenming jiaorong yu chongtu)
5. Civilisation in the Age of Economic Globalisation (zou xiang jingji quan-
qiuhua shidai de wenming)
6. The Current State of Civilisation and its Future (wenming de xianshi he
weilai)
The framing of the Chinese and global past as a story of transitions through
phases dictated by historical materialism was thus superseded by a focus
on “civilisation” and, by implication, “progress.”
Zhou Chunsheng, one of the principal authors of the series, identified Fer-
nand Braudel’s “total history” as a key inspiration, declaring that history be-
longed not to “emperors or generals,” but to “the people.” (46) Zhou claimed
that this model of history education had already won broad acceptance in
Europe and America, implying that where the West had led, China should
follow. If the influence of Braudel permeates the series, so, arguably, does
that of Toynbee, with his interest in the rise and fall of civilisations, largely
categorised according to religion. This focus is reflected in the way in which
the texts draw examples from ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia; India; an-
cient Greece and Rome; medieval and modern Europe; America; and China
itself – above all from the last three.
The unstated assumption that an East Asian “Sinosphere” constitutes one
of these self-contained civilisations had implications for the coverage of
Japan and Korea, which the authors appeared to regard as insufficiently dis-
tinct from China to warrant much separate attention. (47) This somewhat
gives the lie to the vaunted cosmopolitanism of their approach, since the
assumption that “Chinese” civilisation encompasses the whole of East Asia
is a classic expression of Han chauvinism. Indeed, emphasising the status
of the People’s Republic of China as trustee of the world’s only “ancient
civilisation” with an “unbroken history” of thousands of years was recom-
mended as a theme of patriotic education as long ago as 1951. (48)
However, the spotlight in these texts falls largely on Europe and, especially
in sections on the contemporary period, on America. In general, coverage of
the West is far more positive than in earlier texts. A chapter on human rights,
for example, traces the origins of Western rights discourse (through Rousseau
and the French Revolution), cites the Holocaust as background to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and notes the influence of this on contemporary
Chinese political thought. It largely eschews the attacks on Western hypocrisy
that are a standard feature of discussions of “rights” in Chinese texts. (49) Com-
menting approvingly on the new texts, Gerard Postiglione, an American expert
on China’s education system, explained that “the emphasis is on producing in-
novative thinking and preparing students for a global discourse.” It was “nat-
ural,” he went on, for local curriculum developers to question whether the
conventional textbook narrative of modern Chinese history, that “talks so much
about Chinese suffering during the colonial era,” was suited to “creating the
kind of sophisticated talent they want for today’s Shanghai.” (50)
The New York Times (NYT) journalist interviewing Postiglione observed
that junior high texts continued to use “boilerplate idioms to condemn
Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s” and included “little about Tokyo’s
peaceful, democratic post-war development,” thus doing “little to assuage
Japanese concerns that Chinese imbibe hatred of Japan from a young age.”
The main two-volume text indeed pays scant attention to Japan’s post-war
history: there is a picture of a shinkansen, passing reference to Japanese in-
volvement in the International Space Station, and an account of the Aum
Shinrikyou subway attack in the context of a chapter about “cults”
(xiejiao). (51) However, neither do these volumes feature laboured condem-
nations of Japan’s invasion of China; in fact, reference to the war and atten-
dant atrocities is almost entirely absent.
An account of Japan’s post-war development was nonetheless included
in the Year 3 senior high textbook studied only by students in the “human-
ities” stream. (52) As well as a two-page, conventional account of the War of
Resistance – relatively light on “boilerplate idioms” – there is a chapter on
Japan’s “modernisation,” the last of six dealing with “The Process of Mod-
ernisation in Major Developed Countries.” This begins with a rather glowing
account of the Meiji era, emphasising the merits of the Westernised educa-
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tion system introduced during this period. (53) As in the 1995 text, the sub-
sequent descent into war and overseas expansion, from the 1890s onwards,
is represented as the tragic consequence of a deviation from the early Meiji
ideals (and from the “objective laws” of history). (54) Democratisation and
the success of Japan’s postwar “economic miracle” (jingji qiyi) are high-
lighted in the postwar section. However, students are also reminded of
Japan’s failure (by comparison with Germany) to confront issues of “war
guilt,” the Japanese government’s approval of a right-wing history text-
book, (55) and the continued honouring of convicted war criminals in Tokyo’s
Yasukuni Shrine. Again, this largely reproduces material from the 1995 text,
which had reminded students that “for many years, elements within the
Japanese elite have made statements denying the criminal invasion [of
China and other Asian countries] – something that has not failed to attract
the notice of China and other countries that suffered deeply at the hands
of Japanese militarism.” (56)
Ironically, the largely approving NYT article seems to have triggered the
hurried withdrawal of the 2004 texts. Its headline asked “Where’s Mao?”,
the answer being: almost nowhere. The new texts had already come under
criticism from more conservative scholars, who claimed that they trivialised
history. In addition, the broader attempt to introduce “integrated” ap-
proaches and other pedagogical reforms across the school curriculum was
meeting with significant resistance from teachers, many of whom found
the innovations incomprehensible and misaligned with the requirements of
public examinations. (57) Shanghai’s history textbooks went even further than
those used elsewhere, which, although divided into “economics,” “politics,”
and “culture” volumes, maintained a conventional chronological approach.
In this context of pre-existing controversy over the wisdom or practicability
of the post-2001 curricular changes, (58) the political storm caused by the
NYT article appears to have sealed the fate of the Shanghai series. (59) Six
weeks after the article’s publication, the Senior High School Social Studies
Research Centre of the Central Government’s Education Ministry issued a
report authored by a group of “famous” Beijing-based historians criticising
Shanghai’s senior high history textbooks. They objected to the “incoherent”
(hunluan) thinking of the texts’ authors, their neglect of “the realities of
contemporary China’s social development,” their “anti-ideological” (fei yishi
xingtai) stance, and their effective abandonment of Marxist historical ma-
terialism. (60) After fruitless attempts by the chief editor, Su Zhiliang, to ne-
gotiate a revision to the series, the Educational Committee of Shanghai
Municipality peremptorily announced, in mid-May 2007, that the books
would be withdrawn and replaced as of 1 September. (61)
The 2004 Shanghai texts represented a radical attempt to extend the in-
tegration of national and global history pioneered in the preceding 1995
edition. Indeed, so far did this integration proceed in the two-volume com-
pulsory course that the nation almost dissolved away in a solvent of “civil-
isation” and broadly-conceived “progress.” But if the nation faded from view,
then on what hook could messages of “patriotic education” be hung? The
answer is partly to be found elsewhere in the school curriculum, where sub-
jects such as Thought and Politics and (Chinese) Language and Literature
continued to offer ideologically more conventional fare. However, that the
logic of their historical vision led the authors of this series away from themes
readily susceptible to “patriotic” treatment is perhaps not accidental. Su
Zhiliang’s own testimony suggests that “patriotic education” was not his
foremost concern when it came to the portrayal of Japan; instead, he em-
phasised the aim, central to the suzhi jiaoyu movement and the 2002 cur-
riculum reforms, of stimulating students to analyse and reflect. (62) In
practice, much of what coverage of Japan there was – in the compulsory
course, and especially in the separate volume for third-year students – still
alluded to familiar negative stereotypes. However, the authors appear to
have been keen not to scratch the sore points in China’s external relation-
ships, of which those involving Japan were among the sorest. Their text is
suffused by a vision of the international order that is essentially harmonious,
progressive, and optimistic. Whether the failure to reference Mao was in-
tentional or Freudian, it was undoubtedly a product of the absence from
this vision of recognisably socialist concepts. And this in turn reflected the
fact that socialism, especially of the Maoist brand, had come to seem a par-
ticularly remote and alien creed in twenty-first-century Shanghai.
The 2007 series (63)
The short time allowed for the drafting of texts (by new authors and a
new publisher) to replace the withdrawn 2004 edition prompted the adop-
tion of a modular approach, with volumes produced term-by-term rather
than all at once. Both the rushed nature of the enterprise and the political
context in which it was undertaken help account for the reversion to tried-
and-tested formulae, pedagogical as well as ideological. The narrative struc-
ture of the 1995 series has been largely reinstated, along with much Marxist
terminology; historical materialism and “modes of production” are often in-
voked, for example in the titles of sections on “the shoots of capitalist re-
lations of production” (in fifteenth-sixteenth-century Europe) and “the
formation of the capitalist world system” in the mid-nineteenth century
(when it is noted that Japan joined the ranks of the “capitalist” states). Al-
though national and global history are still discussed within the same set
of covers, the new series is rather less integrated than its 1995 predecessor.
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Chinese history is generally dealt with in distinct chapters rather than within
more broadly-themed units.
The overall approach is no more conventionally Marxist than that of
the 1995 books. However, China’s “revolutionary” movements (such as
the Taiping Rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century) are celebrated, and
more prominence is given to revolutionary leaders such as Sun Yatsen
and, unsurprisingly, Mao Zedong. The Communist Party’s contributions
to China’s development are emphasised, with extended treatment of the
country’s post-1949 history. The new texts contain more allusions to
local history than previous series, using local examples to embellish ac-
counts of national events: for example, the chapter on the Cultural Rev-
olution (blamed squarely on the Gang of Four) pictures the establishment
of the “Shanghai Revolutionary Committee.” (64) The text for year three
of senior high school also features a new, dedicated local history section
– but at this stage the subject is only studied by arts and humanities stu-
dents.
That the current texts are less thoroughly integrated, or internationally
comparative, than their 1990s predecessors is partly a consequence of
their less consistent reliance on a Marxist interpretative framework. Al-
though the Meiji Restoration and China’s self-strengthening movement
are discussed in terms broadly similar to those found in earlier texts, stu-
dents are not similarly invited to compare the Chinese and Japanese ex-
periences of modernisation. (65) The fact that Sun Yatsen visited Japan,
and even founded the Tongmenghui there, is afforded the briefest of
mentions, but the role of Japanese precedents in influencing the thought
of major Chinese reformers and revolutionaries is not explicitly noted or
discussed. (66) Although the differences of detail are individually trivial, in
sum they enhance the emphasis on Chinese agency in general, and that
of “great men” in particular, in the grand quest for modernisation and
national strength – and diminish any acknowledgement of Japan’s con-
tribution thereto. And when it comes to war and invasion, class struggle
is no longer allowed to exculpate the Japanese masses: students are told
that “Japanese fascism first arose from within civil society” (shouxian
chanshengyu minjian). (67) The War of Resistance receives extended cov-
erage, with the escalating conflict represented primarily as a consequence
of “national contradictions” between Japan and China (zhong ri liang guo
jian de minzu maodun). (68) New illustrations embellish descriptions of
Japanese atrocities, (69) and the total number of victims of the Nanjing
Massacre is cited as “more than 300,000.” (70) Contrasted with the callous
brutality of the invaders is the steadfast virtue of the Chinese: an account
of the Communist-led “One Hundred Regiments Offensive” of 1940 fea-
tures a new story about the rescue of stranded Japanese children. (71) Mer-
ciful Chinese are contrasted with merciless Japanese.
This new series thus reinstates a conventional chronological approach,
a further-diluted variant of the Marxism of the 1995 texts, and a height-
ened emphasis on Japanese iniquity. Meanwhile, nationally, the more
thematic approach to senior high school history mandated by the cur-
riculum reforms of 2001-2002 remains in place – but for how much
longer? The “Where is Mao?” debacle meant that the conservative back-
lash against “integrated” history teaching was unleashed early in Shang-
hai – but it is a phenomenon that extends well beyond the municipal
boundaries. If the 2004 texts put Shanghai at the forefront of a national
move away from Marxist teleology and towards a radically thematic, in-
tegrated, and cosmopolitan vision of history education at senior high
level, then it is also quite possible that the city may now be leading the
way back towards an ideologically and pedagogically far less adventur-
ous approach.
Conclusion
This article has traced the shifting depiction of Japan through three edi-
tions of Shanghai’s senior high history textbooks. In the 1990s, the history
of modern Japan and its relations with China received extensive coverage,
but Marxist internationalism and class-based analysis moderated “anti-
Japanese” messages. While criticisms were levelled at aspects of Japan’s po-
litical system and specific policies, these were primarily attributed not to
an essentially malign national character, but to historical contingency and
elite machinations. This interpretation – consistent with China’s position
since diplomatic normalisation in the 1970s – left the Japanese people
themselves largely off the hook for the “crimes” of their country’s modern
history.
Between the publication of the earliest series and that of its successor in
2004, China witnessed an ambitious overhaul of the formal school curricu-
lum in 2001-2. Among the chief advocates of these reforms was Zhong Qi-
quan of Shanghai’s East China Normal University, who in turn derived many
of his ideas from contemporary Japan (or from the West via Japan). The sub-
sequent revision of the senior high history curriculum epitomised key ideas
underlying these reforms. Rather than recapitulating the junior secondary
curriculum, the new texts offered a radically different “integrated” global
history. Abandoning the traditional focus on nations – though evincing a
naïve faith in Western modernity and progress – the two-volume compul-
sory course presented a “civilisational” perspective on the past. This left little
space for depiction of Japan, negative or otherwise.
However, this 2004 series ultimately tested to breaking point the limits
of Shanghai’s curricular autonomy. Following the publication of the New
York Times article “Where is Mao?” in September 2006, an official backlash
led to the hasty withdrawal of these texts the following spring. The new se-
ries placed the nation once again centre stage, while a heightened focus on
Chinese history and largely tokenistic deployment of Marxist terminology
lent the narrative a significantly more nationalistic tone. Neglecting to dis-
tinguish between malign elites and downtrodden masses, or to highlight
the role of international forces, the narrative endows national collectivities
such as “China” and “Japan” with essential characteristics and intent. Japan’s
influence on China’s modernisation is ignored in favour of an account that
highlights the role of visionary leaders, especially Sun Yatsen, Mao Zedong,
and Deng Xiaoping. Tropes of Japanese brutality, Chinese humanity, and the
triumphant transcendence of victimhood, common to junior and senior high
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texts elsewhere on the mainland (and to museum displays – see Vickers’ ar-
ticle in the current issue of China Perspectives), resume their place in a thor-
oughly orthodox account of the recent national past.
Shanghai’s license to experiment in history curriculum development thus
appears to have been effectively revoked, but in truth it was never very ex-
tensive. Given the strong municipal pride and sense of local identity – evi-
dent, for example, in the city’s museums – it is noticeable that the local
senior high textbooks have never featured much coverage of local history.
Autonomy has meant mandating textbook editors to present the standard,
approved narrative of the national and global past in a manner suited to
local educational conditions.
In Hong Kong, by contrast, a substantial proportion of the history curricu-
lum has been devoted to local history. However, a look at how Japan has
been portrayed in the national (Chinese) and world history sections of Hong
Kong’s recent school textbooks reveals a tone no less strident, and arguably
more so, than the latest Shanghai texts. Meanwhile, in their coverage of
local history, textbooks typically play down the extent of Hong Kong’s dis-
tinctiveness from the mainland, highlighting instead China’s “contributions”
to the region’s development. (72) There is little acknowledgement of Japan’s
role as Hong Kong’s main trading partner for much of the post-war period,
and no discussion of the huge influence of Japanese popular culture on the
local media and fashion scene.
This serves to remind us that what is left out of a historical narrative is at
least as important as what is left in. (73) As regards the depiction of modern
Japan in the textbooks of Shanghai or Hong Kong, this “null curriculum” re-
lates especially to Japan’s contribution to China’s modernisation, both in
the early twentieth century and since the advent of the “Reform and Open-
ing” period in the late 1970s. Also ignored or (at best) downplayed is the
wartime suffering of the civilian Japanese population, appreciation of which
is essential to any understanding of postwar Japan’s strong commitment to
peace. At the same time, what is said about Japan needs to be seen in the
light of what is not said about China. For obvious reasons, it is far easier for
textbook editors to heap blame on Japan for early-twentieth-century atroc-
ities than it is to discuss more recent sufferings inflicted by Chinese on Chi-
nese. For example, the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution receive
scant coverage, the scale of casualties is played down, and blame is vaguely
apportioned. Such events are portrayed as unfortunate setbacks in the oth-
erwise triumphant march of national improvement under Communist rule,
leaving the Japanese invasion to stand as the supreme catastrophe of
China’s modern history.
These are not original criticisms; indeed, they are frequently voiced in Japan-
ese responses to Chinese attacks on Japan’s history textbooks. Japan’s media
typically represents Chinese hostility as something manufactured by regime
propaganda, not least through the vehicle of schooling. (74) There is much truth
in this, but the question too seldom asked – particularly in Japan – is “Why
does this propaganda resonate with so much of the Chinese public?” In Hong
Kong, still beyond the direct reach of the Communist Party’s propaganda ap-
paratus, many of those most active in Diaoyu/Senkaku protests have also
been at the forefront of local criticism of Beijing’s role in local affairs. (75) The
demographics of protest on the mainland are murkier – but there, too, con-
siderable overlap may exist between constituencies for anti-Japan protest and
for domestic dissent. (76) While the latter incurs obvious risks, venting at Japan
is both less controversial and more difficult to suppress. Consensus over
Japan’s wartime record also explains why Hong Kong texts especially have
tended to gild the patriotic lily in portrayals of Japan – even while attempts
to introduce an overtly pro-Beijing programme of “Moral and National Edu-
cation” (MNE) have met with fierce local resistance. (77) Political and commer-
cial pressure from the mainland play their part, but so does the fundamentally
uncontroversial nature of anti-Japan messages.
As in Hong Kong, so in Shanghai, attempts at a pedagogical “revolution
from above” have thus recently foundered – but the political dynamics have
been very different. In Hong Kong, a Beijing-sponsored initiative met with
concerted local opposition made possible by constitutionally-enshrined
civic freedoms. In Shanghai, the central government conferred on local of-
ficials powers that were used to introduce, with minimal consultation, a
radical (and ironically liberal) new approach to history education; but when
the resulting textbooks caused political embarrassment, the authorities in
Beijing could swiftly intervene to ensure their withdrawal. The fact that local
texts then reverted to a more nationalistic narrative, with conflict with
Japan a major theme, illustrates how in Shanghai as elsewhere in China,
peddling such messages represents the safest option for those eager to
avoid official reprimand or popular criticism. As the latest editions of Shang-
hai’s textbooks demonstrate, this does not necessarily imply strident xeno-
phobia; indeed, the anti-Japan slant of these texts may seem moderate by
comparison with that of their counterparts in some of the more open and
democratic societies of East Asia. (78) Shanghai’s texts, like Chinese textbooks
generally, are also far more restrained in their treatment of Japan than the
popular media and the nationalist blogosphere. However, nationalism – in
China as elsewhere – renders balanced or nuanced coverage of sensitive is-
sues politically difficult. Thus, while Sino-Japanese conflict remains central
to the orthodox account of national history, discussing Japanese influence
on the cultural, economic, and institutional development of modern China
remains far more problematic, even in the city that in many ways epito-
mises that legacy.
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72. See the article by Christine Han in the current issue of China Perspectives.
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75. The prominent Democratic Party legislator Cheung Man-kwong is a prime example.
76. A September 2012 report by Agence France-Presse cites Zhang Min, a political scientist at Beijing’s
Renmin University, remarking how “some protesters in recent anti-Japan demonstrations over a
disputed island chain carried banners that voiced support for Bo [Xilai].” www.rappler.com/
world/13322-china-targets-dissent-in-attack-on-bo-analysts, (accessed on 16 September 2013).
77. See Sebastian Veg, “Hong Kong’s Enduring Identity Crisis,” The Atlantic (online), 13 October 2013.
www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/hong-kongs-enduring-identity-crisis/280622/ (ac-
cessed on 13 October 2013).
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Asia, op. cit., especially Chapters 4, 5, and 7.
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